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We build an endogenous growth model to analyze the relationships between taxation,
corruption, and economic growth. Entrepreneurs lie at the center of the model and face
disincentive effects from taxation but acquire positive beneﬁts from public infrastructure.
Political corruption governs the efﬁciency with which tax revenues are translated into
infrastructure. The model predicts an inverted-U relationship between taxation and
growth, with corruption reducing the optimal taxation level. We ﬁnd evidence consistent
with these predictions and the entrepreneurial channel using data from the Longitudinal
Business Database of the US Census Bureau. The marginal effect of taxation for growth for
a state at the 10th or 25th percentile of corruption is signiﬁcantly positive; on the other
hand, the marginal effects of taxation for growth for a state at the 90th percentile of
corruption are much lower across the board. We make progress towards causality through
Granger-style tests and by considering periphery counties where effective tax policy is
largely driven by bordering states. Finally, we calibrate our model and ﬁnd that the
calibrated taxation rate of 37% is fairly close to the model's estimated welfare maximizing
taxation rate of 42%. Reducing corruption provides the largest potential impact for welfare
gain through its impact on the uses of tax revenues.
& 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Is taxation good or bad for growth? A dominant view is that taxation is detrimental to growth. Taxation reduces the
reward to entrepreneurial innovation and therefore discourages investments that are important for growth. This perspective
emphasizes minimizing the tax burden on successful innovators to encourage more people to try to become successful
innovators. An alternative view argues that taxation should not be analyzed independently from the surrounding economic
and institutional environment. Taxation, in fact, is central for many aspects of this environment: tax revenues fund public
infrastructure, education and schools, legal systems, and much more. Entrepreneurs and innovators often rely heavily on
these public goods, and higher taxation can be growth enhancing if it supports the stronger provision of public goods
because it raises the expected returns to entrepreneurial efforts.1ghion), uakcigit@uchicago.edu (U. Akcigit), julia.cage@sciencespo.fr (J. Cagé),
increase investment opportunities in an economy with imperfect credit markets. For example, see
3), Benabou (1996), and Aghion and Bolton (1997).
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goods effects. There are two likely corollaries to this statement. First, the relationship of growth to taxation will likely be
non-linear, as the marginal incentive effects and public goods effects will differ greatly depending upon existing taxation
levels—the former becoming more painful and the latter becoming less effective as taxation continues to rise. Second, while
the incentive effects may be unambiguous, the public goods effect rests on a crucial assumption: that taxes are being spent
on public goods and not just inefﬁciently wasted or appropriated. We would thus anticipate that the optimal taxation rate
for a very efﬁcient government will be higher than the optimal rate for the most corrupt. The public good effect presumably
explains why some Nordic countries manage to innovate and grow at sustained rates with taxes that are high and highly
progressive, while other countries suffer.
This paper takes up this task in three steps. In Section 2, we build an endogenous growth model to analyze how cor-
ruption and government efﬁciency affect the relationship between taxation and growth. Modifying the Klette and Kortum
(2004) framework, we build a dependence upon public infrastructure and goods into the innovation and entry process.
Taxation revenues can support these public goods, but governments vary in their levels of efﬁciency. The model predicts an
inverted-U relationship between taxation and growth, and the interaction between taxation and corruption has a negative
impact on growth to the left of the peak.
In Section 3, we provide empirical evidence on the relationships between taxation, corruption, and economic growth
using state- and county-level variations within the United States. Our employment and ﬁrm count data are primarily from
the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) of the US Census Bureau. We measure corruption through convictions of local
public ofﬁcials (e.g., Glaeser and Saks, 2006), and we collect data on tax revenues from US tax records. Our state-level
analysis ﬁrst considers how lagged tax revenues and corruption inﬂuence future growth in state GDP and employment. Over
the 1983–2007 period, our panel analysis ﬁnds evidence that is consistent with the model's predicted relationships for
taxation and corruption on economic growth.
Most important, taxation's marginal impact for growth depends sharply on local corruption. The marginal effect of
taxation for growth for a state at the 10th or 25th percentile of corruption is quite positive and robust, and its economic and
statistical importance only begins to taper at the upper end of US tax ranges, if at all. On the other hand, the marginal effects
of taxation for growth for a state at the 90th percentile of corruption are much lower across the board, and its values are
rarely statistically different from zero except at the very lowest levels of initial taxation. Even within the limited range of US
state income taxes, we see evidence for negative growth effects of increased taxes for states with very high levels of cor-
ruption and taxes. By contrast, we ﬁnd it more difﬁcult to establish effects of corruption for growth beyond this link with
taxes in the US context.
Despite using tight empirical speciﬁcations with lagged values that predict future growth, a natural worry is that
unmodeled factors by state may be driving the connections that we are seeing among taxation, corruption, and growth. To
make further progress on these endogeneity issues, we ﬁrst perform Granger-style tests by regressing past instead of future
growth rates on current tax revenues and their interaction with local corruption, and ﬁnd that the corresponding regression
coefﬁcients become insigniﬁcant. Then, we turn to county-level patterns. Picking up on the public goods rationale, we
develop a circular ring around each county that is 100 miles in radius for our base case. For some counties, this entire ring is
still within the county's home state. For other counties, this ring includes parts of other states. We use this ring to develop a
localized taxation and corruption level that is speciﬁc to each county by taking weighted averages of state-level values that
are included in the ring. Taxations and corruption in neighboring states are more strictly exogenous than the behavior of a
county's home state. We ﬁnd that the interaction of corruption and taxation for growth is stronger with these localized
levels. Moreover, the localized interaction effects persist when looking at border counties or counties that draw more than
50% of their weighted taxation and corruption values from states other than their home state. Altogether, these ﬁndings give
us conﬁdence that the identiﬁed link from taxation and corruption to growth is at least partly causal and not the simple
product of omitted factors. As we discuss later, our empirical results have important limitations and are far from perfect, but
they do shine light on this important question for the United States and emphasize the need for continued study in this area.
Finally, to get a better sense of the importance of corruption on growth and welfare, we calibrate a generalized form of
our theoretical model using empirical moments generated from the LBD data. Our list of moments includes key aspects of
ﬁrm dynamics such as entry, exit, growth, and R&D intensity. The calibration exercise allows us to derive the optimal tax
rate. It also allows us to assess the detrimental impact of corruption on growth and welfare. The calibrated model yields an
empirical estimate of the taxation rate of 37%, which is fairly close to the welfare maximizing taxation rate of 42%. More
interestingly, removing corruption fully from the calibrated solution results in a consumption equivalent gain of more than
20%, which is quite important in size. The calibration strongly suggests that the most substantial growth impacts can emerge
from reduced corruption and more efﬁcient government, with optimal tax calibration at our current efﬁciency levels being
second-order.
This paper relates to a whole body of literature on taxation, incentives, corruption, and growth. Representative studies
include Helms (1985), Barro (1990, 1991), Moﬁdi (1990), Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995), Mauro (1995), Mauro (1998),
Fisman and Gatti (2002), Gordon and Lee (2007), Straub (2008, 2011), Hassett and Mathur (2006) and Hauner and Kyobe
(2010). The literature on how entrepreneurship and investment are impacted by taxation includes Gentry and Hubbard
(2005), Petrescu (2009), Djankov et al. (2010), Rohlin et al. (2010), and Nanda (2011). Public investment and economic
growth are discussed by Aschauer (1989), Calderon and Serven (2004), Singhal (2008), and Chakraborty and Dabla-Norris
(2011). Tanzi and Davoodi (2010) and Romp and de Haan (2007) provide comprehensive discussions of the interlinkages
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weaken the public goods necessary for growth (e.g., Del Monte and Papagni, 2001, 2007; Paserman et al., 2008; Fiorino
et al., 2012), with Italian regional variation being frequently exploited. Our work differs from this prior literature in its efforts
to build these factors into an endogenous growth model and then empirically characterize the marginal growth implications
across the US taxation-corruption distribution. This joint distribution provides a much richer portrait of how taxation's
effects are realized. The calibrated model also allows us to provide a micro-founded assessment of optimal taxation levels
given this trade-off. We hope this framework is useful to other researchers approaching this important policy choice.22. Theoretical model
We develop a Schumpeterian growth model of the relationship between taxation, corruption or government efﬁciency,
and growth/innovation. This section outlines the structure of the baseline model where we abstract from physical capital in
the model. In a later section, we generalize the model by introducing capital and then calibrate it to the US data. Proofs and
detailed mathematical derivations are contained in the appendix. Our model contains quality-improving innovations that
generate growth due to the actions of entrants and incumbents. More speciﬁcally, it builds on Klette and Kortum (2004) the
additional feature that the innovation production function depends on the quality of the infrastructure of the economy,
which is provided by the government through taxation. This framework has the attractive feature of allowing simultaneous
study of new entrants with the innovative behavior of multi-product incumbent ﬁrms. Variations in government corruption
and efﬁciency impact the quality of the infrastructure provided per tax dollar, and thus economic growth.3
2.1. Basic environment
2.1.1. Preferences
Consider the following continuous time model. The economy consists of a representative household with preferences
over consumption and leisure
U ¼
Z 1
0
eρt ln CtLtð Þ dt; ð1Þ
where Ct is the consumption of the unique ﬁnal good and Lt is the labor supply by the household. Labor can be used in four
ways: production of the ﬁnal good LP, innovation in incumbent ﬁrms LI, innovation in entrants LE, and government workers
to provide infrastructure LG.
The household owns a balanced portfolio of all the ﬁrms in the economy, therefore its budget constraint is
Ctþ _At ¼wtLtþrtAtþβTt ;
wherewt is the wage, rt is the dividend payment from the asset holdings, _At is the new investment in assets, and Tt is the tax
revenue collected by the government. We normalize the price of the ﬁnal good to Pt ¼ 1 without loss of generality.
2.1.2. Production technology
The unique ﬁnal consumption good Yt is produced using capital Kt and the basket of intermediate varieties Zt according to
the CRS production function
Yt ¼ Kξt Z1ξt : ð2Þ
In this section, we abstract from capital by assuming ξ¼ 0 (hence Yt ¼ Zt). This means that the ﬁnal good is produced only
through the intermediate goods basket Zt which itself is produced using the CES aggregator
ln Zt ¼
Z 1
0
ln zt ið Þ di:
In this expression, i indexes a unique product line. Firms in the same product line compete a la Bertrand, so only the latest
innovator is active in equilibrium. Each intermediate variety is produced using labor only according to the linear production
technology
zt ið Þ ¼ qt ið Þlt ið Þ: ð3Þ2 Our model builds on the existing innovation-based growth literature (Romer, 1986, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Klette and Kortum, 2004). See
also Acemoglu (2009) and Aghion and Howitt (2009) for recent overviews of that literature. Recent theoretical and empirical links of entry dynamics to
economic growth includes Acs et al. (2006), Aghion et al. (2007), Akcigit and Kerr (2010), Acemoglu et al. (2011), Haltiwanger et al. (2013), Glaeser et al.
(2015). Our work also connects to a literature on the determinants of spatial location (e.g., Marshall, 1920; Rosenthal and Strange, 2004; Duranton and
Puga, 2004; Glaeser, 2008; Ellison et al., 2010). This work often emphasizes both theoretically and empirically taxation and the strength of public goods.
Finally, our paper connects to the allocation of talent and growth (e.g., Baumol, 1990; Murphy et al., 1991; Banerjee and Newman, 1993).
3 Our model has a ﬁxed population of workers and thus differs from tax competition frameworks that model increased business movements to
jurisdictions with more favorable environments. Our empirical work below considers these shifts as well.
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MCt ið Þ ¼
wt
qt ið Þ
:
Each innovation improves the productivity of a given line i from qt ið Þ to 1þλ
 
qt ið Þ. A ﬁrm in this economy is deﬁned by a
collection of product lines. In equilibrium, the number of product lines summarizes the state of a ﬁrm. We denote the
number of product lines of an incumbent ﬁrm by nAZþ . A ﬁrm exits the economy and becomes an outsider when n¼0.
2.1.3. Innovation technology
Firms obtain new product lines through innovation. Acquiring product lines contributes to ﬁrm value by increasing ﬁrm
proﬁts. Firms hire LI innovation workers to generate a Poisson ﬂow rate of new innovations. Infrastructure in the economy
and ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge stock complement labor in the innovation production. In particular, the innovation ﬂow I is
generated according to
I¼ αtn1 γ LIγ
 γ
; ð4Þ
where n is the ﬁrm's stock of existing product lines (the ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge stock) and αt is the quality of the econ-
omy's infrastructure. After a small time interval Δt, a ﬁrm f invents a new product with probability IΔt. Innovations are
undirected, and a successful innovation is realized throughout the unit interval 0;1½  with equal probability. When ﬁrm f
innovates in product line j, two things happen. First, the innovating ﬁrm obtains the new product line j and therefore its
number of product lines increases from n to nþ1. Second, the technology in j increases by the step size λ.
For the sake of tractability, we will assume γ ¼ 1=2. Then the innovation production function (4) generates the following
innovation cost function
C I;nð Þ ¼wtLI ¼wt
n
2
x
αt
 2
¼ nc xð Þ;
where x I=n is the innovation intensity.
2.1.4. Infrastructure and government
The economy's infrastructure (broadly deﬁned) aids the innovation efforts of ﬁrms. The stock of infrastructure αt
depreciates at the rate δαA ð0;1Þ at every instant. The government invests Ft in new infrastructure through money derived
from taxation. As a result, the law of motion for the infrastructure can be expressed as
_αt ¼ δααtþFt : ð5Þ
The government hires LGt workers to produce Ft units of infrastructure with a one-to-one technology
Ft ¼ LGt : ð6Þ
The government taxes ﬁrm operating proﬁts (net of innovation expenses)Πt at the rate τA 0; τ½ . Tax revenue Tt is subject to
corruption at a fraction βAð0;1Þ . As a result, only ð1βÞ fraction of the tax revenue turns into government investment
Ft ¼
1β Tt
wt
; ð7Þ
where Tt 
R 1
0 τtΠtðiÞdi. The same amount of tax payers' money turns into better infrastructure if the government is more
effective. Corrupted money βTt is added to the household budget as a corruption income. The resource constraint is Yt ¼ Ct ,
with all expenses in terms of labor units.4
2.1.5. Entry and exit
There is a mass of potential entrants into the intermediate sector of the economy. They generate a ﬂow rate ~x of new
innovations by hiring LE innovation workers according to
~x ¼ αtϕLE;
where ϕ is a constant entry cost parameter. When an outsider innovates, it captures a new product line that has value Vt
deﬁned below. Therefore the value of an outsider Vout can be written as
rVout ¼max
~x
 wt
ϕαt
~xþ ~x VtVout
  	
:
This value function captures the instantaneous ﬂow cost ðwt=ϕαtÞ ~x of attempting to enter the market and the change in the
outsider's value VtVout upon success, which happens at the rate ~x. An incumbent ﬁrm joins the pool of outsiders when it
loses all of its product lines and obtains the value Vout.4 The generalized model in Section 4 adds capital investment to the resource constraint.
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Our focus will be on balanced growth path equilibrium. All equilibrium values will be denoted by an asterisk “n”.
Henceforth we will drop the time subscripts.
Deﬁnition 1. A balanced growth path equilibrium (BGP) of this economy consists of constant prices ðr;wÞ, a constant value
of incumbent ﬁrms VðnÞ, constant incumbent ﬁrm innovation IðnÞ and entrants' innovation ~x yielding the destruction rate
μ, constant infrastructure level α, constant government investment F, constant tax rate τ and the allocation
fYðtÞ;CðtÞ; L; LP ; LI ; LE; T ; fyi ðtÞ; l

i giA ½0;1gtZ0 with the price sequence fp

i ðtÞgiA ½0;1;tZ0 such that ið Þ pi ; yi , and l

i maximize
incumbent ﬁrm (operational) proﬁt for each i and t, iið Þ innovation decisions I nð Þ and ~x maximize the incumbent and
entrant ﬁrm values, respectively, with the outside ﬁrm value being Vout ¼ 0, iiið Þ households maximize their utility given the
prices ðr;wÞ, ivð Þ w and r are compatible by household optimization, vð Þ α evolves following (5), við Þ F satisﬁes (6),
viið Þ L; LP ; LI ; LE , and LG satisfy market clearing given w, and viiið Þ the resource constraint satisﬁes Yt ¼ Ct .
Next we will solve for the balanced growth path equilibrium. From the household's problem, we can express the
Hamiltonian as H¼ ln CLþμ wLþrAþβTC _A
h i
, which delivers the equalities
g¼ rρ and w ¼ C ¼ Y : ð8Þ
Next we turn to the monopolist's problem. Since the ﬁnal goods production function is CRS Cobb–Douglas, and since
factors are paid their marginal product, Euler's theorem implies that expenditure on intermediates is PtZt ¼ Yt . Furthermore,
logarithmic aggregation of intermediates implies that expenditure on each variety is the same. Therefore, demand for
variety i is given by:
zt ið Þ ¼
Yt
ptðiÞ
:
Bertrand limit pricing in each product line i implies that the current innovator ﬁrm prices at the marginal cost of the
previous innovator (i.e., ptðiÞ ¼ ð1þλÞwt=qtðiÞ as the previous owner's technology level is qtðiÞ=ð1þλÞ) and therefore
pt ið ÞMCt ið Þ ¼
λwt
qtðiÞ
:
So monopolist proﬁts are
πt ¼ Yt
λ
λþ1: ð9Þ
We choose the parameters such that ið Þ ﬁrms generate positive proﬁts in equilibrium and iið Þ the maximum possible tax
level τ is sufﬁciently large that one can generate a non-monotonic relationship between taxation and growth.
Assumption 1. Parameters of the model are such that the operating proﬁt is positive for all tax rates and the upper limit of
the maximum tax rate is sufﬁciently large, i.e.,
14
1þλ
2λ 1τ½ 2ϕ2
4
12τ
1þ2τ :
To solve for the optimal innovation decisions, we express the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman equation for an n-product
incumbent ﬁrm. Let μ denote the aggregate equilibrium innovation rate in the economy. Since each of the product lines will
be lost to a competitor at this ﬂow rate, the value function of a ﬁrm with n product lines is written as
rVt nð Þ _V t nð Þ ¼max
x
1τ½  nπt wt nx
2
2α2
h i
þxn Vt nþ1ð ÞVt nð Þ½ 
þμn Vt n1ð ÞVt nð Þ½ 
8><
>:
9>=
>;: ð10Þ
This value function takes an intuitive form. The instantaneous safe return on the left-hand side is equal to the risky expected
return on the right-hand side. The ﬁrst term on the right is the after-tax operating proﬁt of a ﬁrm that generates a gross
proﬁt of nπt and pays an innovation cost of nwt x
2=2α2
 
every instant. The ﬁrm innovates at rate xn, in which case its value
increases by Vt nþ1ð ÞVt nð Þ. Similarly, the ﬁrm loses a product at rate μn, in which case the change is simply
Vt n1ð ÞVt nð Þ.
Since the ﬁrm problem scales up linearly with ﬁrm size, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 1. The value function Vt nð Þ is linear in n and Yt such that Vt nð Þ ¼ vnYt , where v40 is a constant. Moreover the optimal
innovation decision is x ¼ α2v= 1τ½ .
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 
α. When
there is positive entry, an outsider's value is simply Vout ¼ 0 and 1=ϕα¼ v. Therefore,
v ¼ 1
ϕα
and x ¼ α

1τ½ ϕ: ð11Þ
Along the BGP, infrastructure α and government investment F are constant. From the law of motion, F ¼ δαα in steady
state. Then the balanced budget in (7) gives
F ¼ 1β τΠ; ð12Þ
where Π  λ= 1þλ 1=2ϕ2 1τð Þ2 is the equilibrium operating proﬁt. Note that the equilibrium operating proﬁt is
decreasing in the tax rate τ which highlights the disincentive effect of taxation. The equilibrium level of infrastructure is
α ¼ 1β
 
τΠ
δα
: ð13Þ
The government sustains a lower infrastructure in equilibrium if corruption or depreciation is high. The effect of the tax rate
on the equilibrium level of infrastructure is non-monotonic.
The entrant's innovation rate is determined from the optimal values (11) and the value function (10),
~x τð Þ ¼ϕ 1τð ÞαΠρ: ð14Þ
Overall, the aggregate innovation rate μ ¼ xþ ~x from (11) and (14) is
μ ¼ α

1τð Þϕþ 1τð Þϕα
Πρ: ð15Þ
Then, using the fact that the aggregate growth rate is
g ¼ μ ln 1þλ ; ð16Þ
we easily obtain:
Proposition 1. For any given level of government effectiveness β, the effect of an increase in the tax rate has an inverted-U effect
on equilibrium growth,
∂g
∂τ
¼
40 for τoτg
¼ 0 for τ¼ τg
o0 for τ4τg
:
8><
>:
Moreover, the positive impact of tax on growth is smaller if the government is less effective (when β is higher)
∂2g
∂τ∂β
o0 for τoτg :
In words: (i) aggregate growth rate is determined by the rate of new innovation arrivals μ and the size of their con-
tributions ln ð1þλÞ; (ii) taxation and corruption impact innovation efforts and thereby the arrival rate of new innovations;
(iii) while taxation discourages innovation through reducing ex-post rents, it also encourages innovation and growth
through better provision of infrastructure; (iv) taxation contributes to growth initially as there has to be at least some
government revenue to be able to provide the necessary infrastructure in the economy; however, excessive taxation deters
ex ante innovation by reducing the ex-post proﬁts Π too much; (v) the higher the degree of corruption, the lower the
potential contribution of a tax dollar on the economy since less of this tax revenue will go into infrastructure.
Finally, one can look at the effects of taxation and corruption on equilibrium entry and on the size distribution of ﬁrms.
One can ﬁrst establish:
Proposition 2. For any given level of government effectiveness β, the effect of an increase in the tax rate has an inverted-U effect
on the entry rate,
∂ ~x
∂τ
¼
40 for τoτ ~x
¼ 0 for τ¼ τ ~x
o0 for τ4τ ~x
8><
>:
where the cutoff is implicitly deﬁned as 1þ2τ ~x
12τ ~xð Þ 1 τ ~xð Þ2
¼ 2πϕ2.
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We now provide empirical evidence on the impact of income taxation and corruption on economic growth using panel
variation across states and counties within the United States over a 25-year period. We ﬁrst describe the data assembled and
our econometric strategy. We then consider state-level analyses of economic growth. We close this empirical section with a
state-border analysis that uses county-level data and possesses attractive inference properties outlined below. In the next
section, we consider a calibrated form of the model to provide more-structured quantitative evidence.
3.1. Data structure
Our starting point is to empirically examine whether patterns of state-level economic growth for the United
States are consistent with our model's emphasis on the interaction between taxation and corruption. We consider these
issues using state-level variations in the United States for several reasons. First, metrics like taxation and corruption are
notoriously difﬁcult to compare across countries, and by focusing on state-level experiences we have greater
conﬁdence for an apples-to-apples comparison. This approach also allows us to better isolate our taxation and corruption
interests from other national features (e.g., trade reforms, stock market booms), although we must remain diligent for other
state-level factors connected to growth. Second and related, our econometric strategy utilizes a panel analysis to
push the achieved level of identiﬁcation as far as possible. Such a panel analysis requires a sufﬁciently long data span to
measure ﬁxed effects for spatial units, and US data provide this necessary panel length in addition to their homogeneous
measurement.
Typical of endogenous growth frameworks, the focus of our model and upcoming numerical calibrations is GDP per
worker, and we accordingly devote extra attention to this particular outcome in our empirical work. An empirical analysis
using regional variations, however, can also encounter another form of growth through the spatial movement of activity
towards places with improving attributes. Indeed, many varieties of the spatial equilibrium model from the urban literature
(e.g., Glaeser, 2008) require real wages be ﬁxed over cities, thus forcing adjustments over cities to occur via population
changes to keep the spatial equilibrium. In more practical terms, the business press frequently connects a state's business
climate to its ability to attract ﬁrms and workers from other states, which is not present in an endogenous growth model
with ﬁxed populations. We thus complement our model's growth in GDP per worker with a broader set of metrics that
include growth in GDP, workers, establishment counts, and so on. We also consider drivers connected to growth like entry/
exit and patenting. Our goal is to provide a broad and robust depiction of these novel patterns, even where they extend
beyond the model, to establish a comprehensive perspective.
We collect estimates of state GDP from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). We draw our employment and estab-
lishment data from the Census Bureau's Longitudinal Business Database (LBD). The LBD is the business registry for the
United States and contains annual observations for every private-sector establishment with payroll from 1976 onward.
Sourced from US tax records and Census Bureau surveys, the micro-records document the universe of establishments and
ﬁrms rather than a stratiﬁed random sample or published aggregate tabulations. Jarmin and Miranda (2002) describe the
LBD construction. As a representative year, the data include 108 million workers and 5.8 million establishments in 1997. This
data platform provides great ﬂexibility for disaggregating employment growth effects into separate parts.
Our empirical estimations consider the 1983–2007 period, and we structure our data into ﬁve-year time periods that run
from 1983–1987 to 2003–2007.5 Within each time period, we take the average of our economic variables like GDP and
employment. We believe that these ﬁve-year periods provide us the best time horizons for measuring the medium-term
growth impacts from taxation and corruption. Most estimations focus on 46 states and the District of Columbia that have
non-zero state income taxes throughout the period studied. The four excluded states are Nevada, Texas, Washington, and
Wyoming. We have conducted an extensive number of tests regarding these states and ﬁnd very similar results if we
incorporate them in some manner (e.g., assigning them the lowest possible value of income tax revenue per government
expenditures observed in their region over the corresponding period). We occasionally exclude Alaska and Hawaii when
modelling covariates due to data limitations.
Table 1 provides the mean and standard deviation of metrics across observations. States average $167 billion in annual
economic activity over the period studied (for a sample total of almost $8 trillion), and the average GDP per worker is about
$70,000. In a typical year, the average state has 2.3 million workers (for a sample total of 108 million workers). About one-
quarter of these workers are typically in young establishments, which we deﬁne to be establishments aged four years or less.
Around one in ten workers in a given year is employed in an entering or exiting establishment. The average
state has 120,000 establishments with an average employment size of 21 workers. We measure log growth across
the ﬁve-year periods of our data structure, and we winsorize growth rates at their 1% and 99% levels to guard against
outliers. Five-year growth rates average about 5% for deﬂated state GDP per worker and 7–8% for employment and
establishment growth.5 For most employment-related outcomes, the last period is calculated over 2003–2005 due to LBD data releases, although we have conﬁrmed our
aggregate employment effect across the full 2003–2007 period using County Business Patterns.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Mean SD
(1) (2)
A. State analysis
State GDP (billions) 167.46 214.85
State GDP per worker (thousands) 69.77 19.96
Employment levels in LBD (millions, non-agriculture private-sector employer firms) 2.29 2.44
   Young establishments 0.54 0.63
   Old establishments 1.76 1.83
   Entering or exiting establishments 0.25 0.29
Establishment counts in LBD (millions) 0.12 0.13
Employment size of continuing establishments 20.80 3.54
Log growth rates across periods with 1% winsorization
   State GDP 0.275 0.072
   State GDP, deflated 0.132 0.073
   State GDP per worker 0.194 0.060
   State GDP per worker, deflated 0.051 0.077
   Employment 0.081 0.063
   Establishments 0.074 0.051
State income tax revenues (billions) 3.03 4.88
State income tax revenues per initial government expenditures 0.16 0.07
Convictions of government officials 17.7 22.2
B. County border analysis
Employment levels in LBD (thousands) 38.22 136.60
Establishment counts in LBD  (thousands) 2.00 6.41
Log growth rates across periods with 1% winsorization
   Employment 0.086 0.128
   Establishments 0.077 0.091
Fraction of counties on state border 0.38
Fraction with more than 50% of economic activity within 100-mi radius being within home state 0.68
Notes:  Panel A provides descriptive statistics for state-period estimations of taxation, corruption, and economic activity.  The panel consists of 47 
states with four time periods of five years each (1988-1992 to 2003-2007), using earlier and later years as appropriate for growth calculations. 
Variables are calculated as annual average for each five-year period. Panel B provides descriptive statistics for county-border analysis across the 
same four time periods.
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$3 billion in annual revenues. We use a combined measure of corporate and personal income tax given the equivalence for
many small businesses that are “pass-through entities” (e.g., sole proprietorships, limited liability corporations). As
described further below, our empirical work normalizes state income tax revenues by initial government expenditures in
the state. This share averages 16%, recognizing that the denominator is funded to a substantial degree by federal transfers
and states can run unbalanced budgets. The most substantial part of state taxation not included in our analysis is state
sales tax.
The ﬁnal row of Panel A provides our corruption metric. This is the most difﬁcult data piece to measure from a conceptual
perspective, as the efﬁciency with which tax revenues are translated into useful infrastructure can be dampened by factors
beyond overtly corrupt behavior (e.g., incompetence, laziness). While some think tanks are now “grading” states on their
effectiveness of government, these report cards are only very recent and do not offer a long history to analyze. We follow
prior work by considering federal convictions of corrupt public ofﬁcials by state. These data are collected and published by
the Public Integrity Section of the Department of Justice for 93 districts, including some US territories like Guam and Puerto
Rico, which we aggregate to states.6 The corruption cases include local, state, and federal ofﬁcials and stretch back to the
1970s. There are some instances of unreported conviction totals for small districts in a given year, and we code these and
zero convictions to be a single conviction minimum. These choices are not very important as the major bouts of corruption
can see a district jump from 4–5 cases per year to over 50. Measures of convictions are not perfect, especially as they do not6 United States Department of Justice (Public Integrity Section): http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin/.
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“bridge to nowhere”), but they are the best available options given their long history and impartial measurement across
states. The average state has 18 convictions per annum.
Panel B of Table 1 provides county-level data, with the levels and growth rates of LBD activity aligning with the state data
in Panel A. We describe later the shares of counties on state borders.
3.2. Econometric strategy
Our basic empirical speciﬁcation takes the form:
Ys;t ¼ β1 ln ðtaxs;t1Þþβ2 ln ðtaxs;t1Þ
 2þγ ln ðcorruptions;t1Þ
þχ1 ln ðtaxs;t1Þ  ln ðcorruptions;t1Þþχ2½ ln ðtaxs;t1Þ2  ln ðcorruptions;t1Þþϕsþηtþϵs;t ; ð17Þ
where ϕs and ηt are state and period ﬁxed effects, respectively. The variable taxs;t1 is the average income tax revenues
collected in the previous ﬁve-year period converted into constant 2000 dollars. The variable corruptions;t1 is the average
number of ofﬁcials convicted of crimes in the previous period. The ﬁnal terms interact the tax variables with the corruption
measure.
Our two main regressor variables are normalized by a time-invariant measure of state size. Our reported speciﬁcations
use average government expenditures in the state from the initial period as the measure of state size, and we ﬁnd similar
results using other state size measures such as initial state employment or GDP. With the log speciﬁcation, this normal-
ization choice only impacts the estimation through the interaction effect, and the added baseline provides a relative sense of
the magnitude of the tax or corruption changes for interaction. Similar to our growth metrics, we winsorize our explanatory
variables at their 1% and 99% values.
We demean both the taxs;t1 and corruptions;t1 regressors prior to interaction to restore their main
effects. We thus anticipate a positive β1 coefﬁcient and negative β2 coefﬁcient. This coefﬁcient pattern would suggest an
inverted-U shape to marginal tax effects: at the mean value of corruption, increases in lagged tax revenues are associated
with increases in the outcome variables Ys;t so long as taxes are not too high. As we return to later, both in our
empirical work and in our calibration, the state-level variation that exists in the United States appears to be mostly, if not
fully, contained on the left-hand side of any inverted-U, which may limit the precision with which we can measure the
curvature.
We also anticipate a negative γ coefﬁcient as increases in lagged corruption, everything else equal, should decrease future
economic activity. Finally, we anticipate negative χ1 and χ2 coefﬁcients: higher corruption should weaken any positive
taxation effects, and this discouragement should be particularly strong when taxes and corruption are very high. Negative
interaction effects would suggest that periods of high tax revenues per capita, which have the capacity to promote
unmeasured public goods when used correctly, were not followed by better growth in states that were particularly corrupt
during the period. In many respects, we concentrate most on the presence of a negative χ1 given the central importance in
our theory of the interaction between taxation and corruption.
There are several potential challenges to this econometric strategy that we should note. First, we have standard omitted
variable bias questions about whether our model captures all of the relevant growth factors necessary for teasing out the
roles of taxation and corruption. These concerns are our central motivation for pursuing ﬁrst and foremost panel analyses
that allow us to control for persistent state traits connected to economic growth over the last three decades (e.g., warm
climate, right to work laws). To bias our estimates, this approach requires that the missing factors move in a correlated
manner with our explanatory variables, which is a ﬁrst but crucial defense, and we also test directly for robustness to other
state-level factors below. Of course, the ﬂip-side of this controlled platform is that we are measuring relationships through
deviations from means for states, which could be transient and mean reverting, and so we also consider below less-
structured approaches as well.
Second, we face difﬁcult questions about reverse causality. Corruption can be exogenous or endogenous. An example of
the former, from the perspective of our study, is simply the unexpected “bad apple” politician who starts to behave corruptly
without new economic conditions to prompt the behavior. The more-worrisome endogenous channel for our work would
be where a change in growth prospects or economic conditions for a region give rise to the corruption itself. This reverse
channel could work equally for or against ﬁnding the anticipated negative effect. It could be, for example, that heightened
growth prospects give more scope for corruption to occur (e.g., demand for regulatory approvals give rise to bribery); it
could alternatively be that declining growth prospects of a state shift activity towards corruption as rent seeking becomes
the most productive way to make money (e.g., Baumol, 1990).
We have two main routes to assess whether the results that we observe are due to reverse causality. The ﬁrst is to
consider the timing of variables, and speciﬁcation (17) models lags of explanatory variables. As a pseudo Granger test of
causality, we test reversing this timing and model whether forward explanatory variables predict current growth. Our
results generally conﬁrm that the timing of corruption versus growth consequences is more in line with the theory laid out
rather than the reverse.
The second route is to study settings where we believe the corruption that is impacting economic outcomes is more
exogenous in terms of not being the focus of the corrupt politician. This concept is built into our state-border analysis using
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form. Counties in the Florida panhandle can be substantially inﬂuenced by the functioning of the counties in Alabama and
Georgia that share the border with them. The bordering counties are inﬂuenced by the corruption/effectiveness of activity in
the state capitals located in Montgomery and Atlanta, which are respectively about 100 and 250 miles from the closest
border point with Florida. Our identifying assumption for this work is that the corruption levels in these state capitals are
being made without strong reference to these border counties, but that they can still matter (e.g., due to misappropriation of
highway funds that impact roads throughout the state). As we pick up in more detail later, we conﬁrm our results in such
settings to provide reassurance against reverse causality being the factor behind our outcomes.
3.3. State-level results
Tables 2a and b consider the log of state GDP as the left-hand variable Ys;t . In the presence of the state ﬁxed effects ϕs,
these estimations measure how changes in the income taxation and corruption levels of a state correlate to subsequent
expansions in economic activity. This is the simplest test of Propositions 1 and 2, where better business environments are
predicted to increase the rate of new innovation arrivals that engender growth. After studying these levels estimations, we
turn to whether the effects are powerful enough to measure statistically signiﬁcant accelerations in growth rates, which are
the stronger predictions of the model. The regressions have 188 observations from the cross of 47 states and four time
periods. We cluster standard errors by state.
Column 1 of Table 2a begins with a simpler model than speciﬁcation (17) where we drop the squared values for taxation.
This estimation shows a very stable and well-deﬁned pattern. The β1 coefﬁcient for income taxation revenues is positive and
statistically signiﬁcant, the γ coefﬁcient for corruption is negative but not economically nor statistically important, and the
χ1 interaction of corruption and taxation is negative and statistically signiﬁcant. We provide shortly an interpretation of the
joint size of the results and, for now, focus on their stability. We weight our baseline speciﬁcations by the initial employ-
ment count in the state to provide a sense of mean treatment effects. Column 2 shows similar results when excluding these
sample weights, although the interaction falls just short of statistical signiﬁcance due to the larger standard errors. Sample
weights tend to focus attention on better quality data as very small states are more likely to show outlier behaviors, but the
results are overall quite comparable in unweighted formats.
Columns 3 and 4 incorporate region x period ﬁxed effects to capture broad differences across areas of the United States in
terms of their pace of growth, corruption, and so on. As a very noticeable example, much of US growth during the last three
decades has been in warmer and sunnier cities in the South and West, compared to the Northeast and Midwest. ColumnTable 2a
Panel relationship of taxation, corruption and state economic activity.
Base Including Including Including Including Including
estimation Excluding period fixed period fixed time trends for fixed effects Including squared
with state and initial effects by effects by 1987 population, for period x lagged taxation term
time period employment four census nine census patents, and initial tax state activity and corruption
fixed effects weights regions divisions education levels quartile of state in prior period interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log tax revenues per 0.183* 0.140* 0.140** 0.048 0.165* 0.171* 0.081 0.182*
gov. exp. in prior period (0.096) (0.073) (0.067) (0.045) (0.082) (0.106) (0.059) (0.096)
Log tax revenues per -0.033
gov. exp. in prior period SQ (0.024)
Log corruption per -0.017 -0.006 -0.014 -0.009 -0.018 -0.017 -0.012 -0.012
gov. exp. in prior period (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.010) (0.014) (0.015) (0.012) (0.019)
Interaction of taxes and -0.060** -0.049 -0.055** -0.039** -0.053*** -0.053** -0.040*** -0.072*
corruption in prior period (0.023) (0.033) (0.022) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.013) (0.040)
Interaction of taxes and -0.021
corruption in prior pd. SQ (0.028)
Log state GDP 0.465***
in the prior period (0.123)
State and period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Dependent variable is log state GDP in period
Notes:  Estimations consider the panel relationship among taxation, corruption, and economic activity.  The panel consists of 47 states with four time periods of five years each (1988-1992 
to 2003-2007), using lagged values from prior periods.  The dependent variable is log state GDP in the current period.  The variable of interest is the interaction of lagged state income tax 
receipts and corruption (i.e., criminal convictions of public officials).  Both metrics are normalized by initial state public expenditures and demeaned prior to interaction.  Estimations 
weight by initial state employment, cluster standard errors by state, include state and period fixed effects, and have 188 observations.  There is less future economic expansion and growth 
following periods of high tax revenues when corruption is high. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Table 2b
Estimated marginal taxation effects for state GDP.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Overall 0.231 (0.098) 0.207 (0.096) 0.182 (0.096) 0.159 (0.096) 0.133 (0.097)
10th 0.267 (0.098) 0.252 (0.100) 0.237 (0.102) 0.223 (0.105) 0.207 (0.108)
25th 0.245 (0.100) 0.219 (0.097) 0.192 (0.096) 0.167 (0.097) 0.139 (0.099)
50th 0.235 (0.103) 0.204 (0.098) 0.171 (0.097) 0.142 (0.100) 0.107 (0.106)
75th 0.228 (0.106) 0.193 (0.100) 0.157 (0.099) 0.123 (0.104) 0.085 (0.115)
90th 0.221 (0.110) 0.183 (0.102) 0.144 (0.102) 0.108 (0.109) 0.066 (0.124)
A.  Estimated marginal tax effects from linear estimation in Column 1 of Table 2a
B.  Estimated marginal tax effects from squared estimation in Column 8 of Table 2a
Notes:  See Table 2a.  Estimated marginal tax effects are calculated at various points in the taxation-corruption distribution. In Panel B, 
coefficients to the left and above the indicated line are statistically significant at a 10% level.
Taxation 
percentile
Corruption percentile
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
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sensitive to including period ﬁxed effects interacted with the nine census divisions, but otherwise the results are extremely
stable, which is encouraging given the different stress tests performed. The region-period ﬁxed effects help conﬁrm that our
results are not due to differential growth trends across the United States.
Column 5 tests introducing controls for time trends interacted with the traits of states in 1987, at the start of our sample
period. We measure for states their initial log levels of population, patenting (reﬂective of R&D investments),
and high-school educated workers. We interact these baseline levels with a trend for years and introduce these three
controls into the speciﬁcation. The state ﬁxed effects control for the initial traits, while the period ﬁxed effects control for
common time effects. If anything, these controls sharpen our estimation further, suggesting that the growth results are not
capturing ongoing trends in these modelled factors. It is worth noting, however, that we do not ﬁnd consistent results when
taking this approach to an extreme and modelling separate time trends for each state. Given that we only have four
observations per state, this latter sensitivity is anticipated if also disappointing, and we must stop at modelling factors
directly.
Column 6 considers whether the estimated effects are descending from a single block of states in the tax distribution
behaving in a uniform manner. One example of this could be lower-tax states persistently lagging as a group the perfor-
mance of higher-tax states; a second example might be states in the middle of the tax distribution consistently targeting
taxation breaks and subsidies to lure ﬁrms from high-tax neighbors, which would be comparable to the ﬁndings of Wilson
(2009) for R&D tax breaks at the state level. To test for these types of concerns, we group states by their initial taxation
levels into quartiles. We then include quartile x period ﬁxed effects that require the identifying variation to be within these
groups. The results are robust to this control, providing comfort that our ﬁndings are not due to one particular block of states
in terms of taxes behaving in a uniform manner to give us an inﬂated sense of precision. We likewise ﬁnd this robustness
when allowing assignment to tax quartiles to be time varying or when using terciles/halves.
The results further hold up well when including lagged state GDP in Column 7, and we similarly ﬁnd consistent results
when dropping the state ﬁxed effects and modelling just a single control for initial state GDP. In both cases, the main effects
for taxation weaken somewhat, while the interaction effect remains very strong. We have further conﬁrmed that our results
are not dependent upon any one state or time period being included in the sample.
Column 8 includes the squared terms present in speciﬁcation (17). The results here are mixed. On one hand,
the point estimates for β2 and χ2 are negative, indicative of the inverted-U shape present in theory. Moreover, the economic
magnitudes implied are of reasonable economic size, as we map out further in Table 2b. To give a rough sense,
holding corruption ﬁxed at the US median, moving from the 25th to 75th percentile of state income tax levels (the inter-
quartile range) is associated with an 18% reduction in the positive connection between GDP expansion and taxation.
At the 90th percentile of corruption, this implied reduction across the interquartile range is 40%. On the other hand, the
squared terms are not statistically signiﬁcant (β2 is close) and the overall curvature quantiﬁed by these estimates means that
we are measuring all effects on the left-side portion of the curve where taxes and growth are positively related given US
conditions.
We next calculate the “marginal effects” for GDP expansion for an income tax or corruption increase at various points in
the taxation-corruption distribution. We place quotes around marginal effects for two reasons. First, we remain a long ways
from establishing causality at this point, and evenwhere the paper ultimately makes the best progress (e.g., the state-border
analysis) these techniques do not cover all outcomes. Thus, we use the term for convenience but under these caveats.
Second, we are using localized variations of states around their long-term averages of taxation, corruption, and growth. This
Table 3a
Panel relationship of taxation, corruption and state growth.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Log tax revenues per 0.082 0.082 0.030* 0.029 0.029 0.032 0.019 0.019
gov. exp. in prior period (0.059) (0.059) (0.018) (0.019) (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) (0.023)
Log tax revenues per -0.032*** -0.011 -0.010 -0.004
gov. exp. in prior period SQ (0.011) (0.008) (0.008) (0.007)
Log corruption per -0.011 -0.009 -0.009 -0.007 -0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.003
gov. exp. in prior period (0.012) (0.016) (0.008) (0.011) (0.009) (0.012) (0.006) (0.010)
Interaction of taxes and -0.040*** -0.048* -0.016** -0.022 -0.016** -0.019 -0.014** -0.016
corruption in prior period (0.013) (0.029) (0.008) (0.016) (0.007) (0.018) (0.005) (0.014)
Interaction of taxes and -0.017 -0.009 -0.006 -0.003
corruption in prior period SQ (0.020) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011)
Lagged log state level -0.533*** -0.537*** -0.656*** -0.639*** -0.410*** -0.423*** -0.371*** -0.372***
in the prior period (0.123) (0.118) (0.062) (0.063) (0.060) (0.065) (0.088) (0.091)
State and period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 188
Notes:  Estimations consider the panel relationship among taxation, corruption, and economic activity.  The panel consists of 47 states with four time periods of five years 
each (1988-1992 to 2003-2007), using lagged values from prior periods.  The dependent variables are log state growth rates indicated in column headers.  The explanatory 
variable of interest is the interaction of lagged state income tax receipts and corruption (i.e., criminal convictions of public officials).  Both metrics are normalized by initial 
state public expenditures and demeaned prior to interaction.  Estimations weight by initial state employment, cluster standard errors by state, and include state and period fixed 
effects.  There is less acceleration in economic growth following periods of high tax revenues when corruption is high.  Marginal effects for Columns 1-4 are presented in 
Tables 3b-3c. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
state GDP state establishmentsstate employmentstate GDP per worker 
Log growth in Log growth in Log growth in Log growth in
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Thus our approach requires the important identifying assumption that the within-state movements observed in one part of
the distribution would hold true for other states were they in that range.7
Panel A of Table 2b provides marginal effects for the baseline linear speciﬁcation in Column 1 of Table 2a,
while Panel B considers the estimation with squared tax terms in Column 8. In Panel B, we show statistical signiﬁcance
using the indicated line for visual ease—estimates to the left and above the line are precisely measured at a 10% level. The
marginal effects are most powerful in states with low taxation and corruption (the upper left of Panel B). They
are not distinguishable from zero in states with high taxes and corruption (lower right). In low corruption states, the
marginal effects of taxation are statistically different from zero at all tax levels. In settings with high corruption, the
marginal effects are only strong when taxes are very low. These patterns conform to the basic trade-offs discussed in the
introduction.
We ﬁnd similar results when using a ﬁrst-differenced format, with the coefﬁcients for taxation, corruption
and their interaction being 0.088 (0.045)n, 0.005 (0.010), and 0.034 (0.013)nnn, respectively. The efﬁciency of the ﬁrst-
differenced format versus the levels speciﬁcation turns on whether the error term is autoregressive. If autoregressive
deviations are substantial, the ﬁrst-differenced form is preferred; a unit root error is fully corrected. If there is
no serial correlation, however, ﬁrst-differencing introduces a moving-average error component. The residual correlation is
modestly lower for the levels estimations at 0.072, making it the preferred technique. Either way, the results are quite
comparable and continue to show expansions in economic activity that are connected to taxation, corruption, and their
interactions.
Table 3a next considers growth rates as dependent variables Ys;t . We retain the state ﬁxed effects, so that these estimates
test whether growth accelerates or declines for a state based upon lagged corruption and tax revenues. This approach tests
the even stronger forms of Propositions 1 and 2. We include period ﬁxed effects and control for the lagged level of the state
to capture convergence or mean reversion processes. We consider four log growth measures: growth in state GDP, growth in
state GDP per worker, growth in state employments, and growth in state establishment counts. As noted earlier, our model
most centrally focuses on the GDP-linked measures, but we seek the broader estimates of employment and establishments
as well.7 Along these lines, it is important to clarify how the long-term positions of states with respect to taxes and corruption inﬂuence our estimates. When
looking at the simple linear interaction of taxation and corruption, we identify off of local shifts in variables, not their rank order. Estimates with squared
terms utilize more of the state-level distribution to map out the non-linear relationship, but the estimates are still using variation within states. Thus, we
do not need to argue that the full state distribution is exogenous, but we do need to maintain our identifying assumption that the within-state movements
observed in one part of the distribution would hold true for other states were they in that range.
Table 3b
Est. marginal taxation effects for growth in state GDP.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Overall 0.113 (0.061) 0.098 (0.060) 0.081 (0.059) 0.066 (0.058) 0.049 (0.058)
10th 0.151 (0.062) 0.143 (0.062) 0.136 (0.062) 0.129 (0.063) 0.121 (0.064)
25th 0.126 (0.061) 0.109 (0.060) 0.092 (0.059) 0.076 (0.060) 0.057 (0.062)
50th 0.115 (0.063) 0.094 (0.059) 0.072 (0.059) 0.052 (0.061) 0.029 (0.067)
75th 0.107 (0.064) 0.083 (0.059) 0.058 (0.059) 0.035 (0.064) 0.008 (0.073)
90th 0.101 (0.066) 0.074 (0.060) 0.046 (0.060) 0.020 (0.066) -0.010 (0.079)
A.  Estimated marginal tax effects from linear estimation in Column 1 of Table 3a
B.  Estimated marginal tax effects from squared estimation in Column 2 of Table 3a
Notes:  See Table 3a.  Estimated marginal tax effects are calculated at various points in the taxation-corruption distribution.
Taxation 
percentile
Corruption percentile
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
Table 3c
Est. marginal taxation effects for growth in state GDP per worker.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Overall 0.043 (0.019) 0.036 (0.018) 0.030 (0.018) 0.024 (0.018) 0.017 (0.018)
10th 0.054 (0.018) 0.051 (0.018) 0.048 (0.019) 0.046 (0.020) 0.042 (0.022)
25th 0.048 (0.022) 0.040 (0.019) 0.033 (0.018) 0.025 (0.018) 0.017 (0.020)
50th 0.045 (0.025) 0.035 (0.021) 0.025 (0.020) 0.016 (0.021) 0.006 (0.025)
75th 0.043 (0.028) 0.032 (0.023) 0.020 (0.022) 0.009 (0.024) -0.003 (0.030)
90th 0.041 (0.031) 0.029 (0.025) 0.016 (0.024) 0.004 (0.027) -0.010 (0.035)
A.  Estimated marginal tax effects from linear estimation in Column 3 of Table 3a
B.  Estimated marginal tax effects from squared estimation in Column 4 of Table 3a
Notes:  See Table 3a.  Estimated marginal tax effects are calculated at various points in the taxation-corruption distribution.
Taxation 
percentile
Corruption percentile
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
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worker both contribute to overall GDP growth, in roughly equal proportions. This decomposition is not exact because we
allow the lagged state level to adjust across speciﬁcations to match the dependent variable. These results are robust to
including the regional or initial tax quartile controls. Growth in establishments is weaker than growth in employment.
These patterns suggest that favorable taxation and corruption environments encourage more ﬁrms, more workers per ﬁrm,
and higher productivity per worker.
Tables 3b and c provide the distributional patterns for growth in state GDP and GDP per worker. Growth robustly
accelerates in the least corrupt states until at least the 75th percentile of taxes. On the other hand, growth only accelerates
with taxation at very low tax rates in the most corrupt states, and the point estimates suggest growth actually declines with
higher tax rates in the most corrupt states. Marginal effects for employment and establishment growth are similar in shape
but not precisely measured.
In addition to the precision of individual coefﬁcients, these models have a good overall ﬁt as measured through partial R-
squared values. These are determined by regressing the outcomes and our three core right-hand side variables on panel
ﬁxed effects and predicting the residuals. For growth regressions, we also include the lagged terms with the ﬁxed effects.
The R-squared value of residuals for the outcome variable on the residuals for the core right-hand side variables quantify the
predictive power of the estimation after the ﬁxed effects are removed. The partial R-squared values in the levels framework
are 7–9%, and they are 3–4% in the growth panels.
Table 4
Growth estimations with covariates modelled.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log tax revenues per -0.011 -0.007 -0.002 0.009* 0.012*** 0.012*
gov. exp. in prior period (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.007)
Log corruption per -0.016** -0.015* -0.010 0.005 0.006 0.004
gov. exp. in prior period (0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Interaction of taxes and -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.013 -0.016** -0.013* -0.013*
corruption in prior period (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Lagged log state level -0.008* -0.007 -0.085** -0.241***
in the prior period (0.004) (0.008) (0.040) (0.045)
Log January temperature 0.044*** 0.053*** 0.045*** 0.023*** 0.033*** 0.045***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.006) (0.008) (0.008)
Log bachelor's education share 0.057* 0.060** 0.037 0.100*** 0.138*** 0.149***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.043) (0.020) (0.027) (0.033)
Period fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Yes Yes
Observations 180 180 180 180 180 180
Log state GDP per worker growth
Notes:  See Table 3a. Estimations exclude state fixed effects and instead model growth covariates. Additional covariates control for housing 
prices, population density, Bartik-style growth projections for employment using the initial industry distribution interacted with national 
growth by industry, and the housing supply elasticity of cities measured by Saiz (2010) through geographic features of cities. *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Log state GDP growth
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ariates. While we design our ﬁve-year panels to capture the medium-term impact of taxation and corruption, we noted
earlier the importance of testing the sensitivity of looking at deviations around state ﬁxed effects. We focus on core traits
that the urban economics literature identiﬁes as important for US city growth since the 1970s. We connect to this literature
for two reasons. First, US growth has been concentrated in cities over the past decades, and we can provide sharper controls
by building up from cities to states. As an example, temperature and housing supply capacity vary across cities within a
single state, and so we design our controls for growth traits as population-weighted averages over cities within each state.
Second, entrepreneurship is known to be the key driver in this urban growth literature (e.g., Glaeser et al., 2010, 2015), and
thus we can connect to a broader line of research in this project with this approach.
Wemodel both constant and time-invariant traits. The city growth literature strongly emphasizes the importance of climate and
human capital to explain recent growth. Accordingly, our simplest covariate model includes a control for January temperature, to
reﬂect the large shifts in population towards warmer climates, and a time-varying measure of the log share of workers with a
bachelors' education, taken from the Decennial Censuses, to model the rise of the skilled city. We also consider an extended
covariate model that further includes four additional controls: housing prices, population density, Bartik-style growth
projections for employment using the initial industry distribution interacted with national growth by industry, and the housing
supply elasticity of cities measured by Saiz (2010) through geographic features of cities like coastlines, elevation and mountains,
and so on.
The encouraging news in Table 4 is that this approach yields many similar results to our ﬁxed effect estimations. Our key
focal point has been the negative interaction between taxation and corruption, which is robustly conﬁrmed with the
alternative speciﬁcation. The main effects for taxation are weaker than in Table 3a, but they remain precisely estimated for
GDP per worker growth. Beyond these six factors, we considered other growth-related traits like the number of highway
lanes in the state in 1970, July temperature levels, annual snowfall totals, and aggregate population levels. While these
factors often have univariate correlations with city growth, they do not stand out in multivariate frameworks with the other
factors developed. Most important, however, is that the additional factors do not further inﬂuence the core interaction
between taxation and corruption that is our focus.
Table 5 next extends our basic speciﬁcation to various components of employment growth in a second decomposition exercise.
The LBD dataset allows us to identify establishment ages, and we quantify the extent to which employment growth is in younger
or older establishments. Both groups have comparable interaction effects, while the main effect of taxation for older establish-
ments is larger. The third column measures how taxes and corruption inﬂuence entry/exit by summing employment in entering
or exiting establishments. This pattern is very close to the young establishment estimations in Column 1. We ﬁnd comparable
results on the entry and exit margins individually. For entry, we also ﬁnd mostly uniform patterns across different initial
employment sizes of establishments. The fourth column estimates how taxes and corruption inﬂuence the average employment
Table 5
Panel relationship of taxation, corruption and economic activity.
Log total Log total Log total Log average Log patenting Log patenting
employment employment employment size of of individuals of incumbent
in young in old in entry/exit continuing and firms that firms that are
establishments establishments establishments establishments are younger five years old
in period in period in period in period than five years or more
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log tax revenues per 0.088 0.160 0.092 0.049 0.085 0.115
gov. exp. in prior period (0.110) (0.120) (0.130) (0.032) (0.137) (0.280)
Log corruption per 0.005 -0.008 0.007 0.004 0.003 -0.086
gov. exp. in prior period (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.006) (0.038) (0.085)
Interaction of taxes and -0.043*** -0.055** -0.045** -0.014 -0.092** -0.075
corruption in prior period (0.015) (0.025) (0.018) (0.010) (0.037) (0.076)
State and period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 188
Notes:  See Table 2a.  Column 1 of Table 2a is repeated for various economic outcomes. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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are important contributors to our overall growth patterns as continuing establishments typically account for over 80% of
employment.
Looking across these four columns, the overall employment growth effects are not due to any single channel, but instead
a consequence of growth on multiple margins. This parallels our earlier patterns of equal contributions to state GDP growth
from both growth in worker counts and growth in GDP per worker. Marginal effects across the taxation-corruption dis-
tribution for these outcomes are positive and have the predicted shapes. The consequence of the weaker main effects for
taxation, however, is that these marginal effects are mostly statistically insigniﬁcant. The more precise estimates are for the
older or continuing ﬁrms given their more powerful main effects.
Throughout this paper, we take a very broad view of the term innovation to mean any entrepreneurial efforts that seek to
enhance a ﬁrm's sales and performance. These can include classic R&D type activities, but much of the state GDP and
employment patterns that we are observing here are related instead to non-R&D ﬁrms: opening or expanding a new res-
taurant concept, launching a temporary help agency or gardening service, designing new chemical products for local cus-
tomers, and so on. All of these innovators face the disincentive effects of taxation and the positive enhancement from local
public goods being better provisioned.
While this broader picture is important for this paper, it is interesting to look brieﬂy at one innovative activity—patenting
—where we can also examine different types of ﬁrms (e.g., Hall et al., 2001). We assign patents to states based upon the
location of inventors. Columns 5 and 6 look at the patenting by assignee age similar to Columns 1 and 2. The patterns are
quite comparable, with a slightly larger point estimate for older patenting ﬁrms and a very sharp interaction effect of
taxation and corruption for young patenting assignees. This suggests that the development of new patenting ﬁrms is
particularly sensitive to the interaction between taxation and corruption. This exercise also has the beneﬁt of showing our
patterns in an additional data source beyond state GDPs and our LBD data.
To conclude this state-level analysis, we run Granger-style reverse regressions where the left-hand side outcomes are the
previous period values of log state GDP, log state employment, log state GDP growth, and log state employment growth. As
emphasized above, this test of timing is an important starting point for establishing a causal relationship. Table 6 shows that the
interaction term between taxation and corruption is weak and statistically insigniﬁcant in these regressions. This provides some
baseline conﬁdence, if incomplete, that the panel outcomes observed thus far do not solely reﬂect reverse causality.
3.4. County-level results
The state-level results provide a comprehensive view of the linkages between taxation, corruption, and growth. Despite
using lagged values of corruption and taxation to predict future growth, natural worries persist around potential endo-
geneity (e.g., local politicians become more corrupt with diminished growth prospects) or omitted factors correlated with
our explanatory variables. Our empirical setting unfortunately does not lend itself to instrumental variables. While prior
work has identiﬁed ways of instrumenting for one region's taxation with its neighbors (e.g., Gordon and Lee, 2007), our
main interest is in the interaction of taxation and corruption in a panel setting. We would thus require time-varying
instruments for taxation and corruption across a 20-year period, which presents insurmountable challenges (especially for
exogenous changes in local corruption).
Table 6
Lead/lag test of panel relationship.
Log state Log state Log state Log state
GDP employment GDP growth employment
in prior period in prior period in prior period growth
in prior period
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log tax revenues per 0.058 0.091 -0.051 -0.061
gov. exp. in current period (0.113) (0.155) (0.196) (0.148)
Log corruption per 0.006 0.008 0.026 0.024
gov. exp. in current period (0.029) (0.032) (0.033) (0.029)
Interaction of taxes and -0.001 0.003 0.013 0.039
corruption in current period (0.044) (0.055) (0.050) (0.029)
State and period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 141 141 94 94
Notes:  See Tables 2a and 3a.  Columns 1 and 2 consider lagged state GDP and employment on current tax revenues 
and corruption akin to a Granger causality test.  Columns 3 and 4 consider lagged state GDP and employment growth 
and control for the lagged level two periods before.
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which they are inﬂuenced by the taxation and corruption of other states. Some counties are in the middle of big states and
thus are only weakly inﬂuenced by other states, if at all. Other counties are on the edges of states and therefore are sub-
stantially inﬂuenced by what happens in other states. The identiﬁcation concept is that Alabama's and Georgia's taxation,
provision of public goods, and corruption impact counties in the northern Florida panhandle much more than counties
surrounding Miami, several hundred miles from the border. Moreover, while lagged corruption and taxation for state
variables are perhaps endogenous to that state, they can be treated as exogenous for counties in other states. Taxation and
corruption in Alabama and Georgia are most directly determined by what happens in their own big cities and state capitals
(e.g., Atlanta, Birmingham, and Montgomery), yet the effects can be felt throughout the states (e.g., quality of roads and
schools) and thus impact the counties in northern Florida.
Holmes (1998) provides a seminal application of using border effects to discern the economic effects of state policies, and
Rohlin et al. (2010) provide an excellent recent application to the link between taxes and entrepreneurship. Border effects
papers like these two typically describe whether there is more or less activity in a narrow spatial range on one side of the
border versus the other side that is consistent with a policy difference between the states. Our approach differs from this
work in two key ways. First, the nature of our underlying mechanisms requires a larger spatial range than a strict border
discontinuity: corruption and public goods well beyond the ﬁrst ten miles on the opposite side of the border can matter
deeply for counties at the edge of states.8 Second, we only look at panel variation in economic determinants and outcomes.
Thus, permanent differences in economic activity around the border due to long-term policy choices or corruption levels—
which are typically the focus of border studies like Holmes' (1998) ﬁndings regarding right-to-work laws—are controlled for
by panel effects.
While this spatial analysis provides a path towards a more causal statement, the impact that this approach will have on
some of our coefﬁcient magnitudes is less clear. For example, greater taxation that is efﬁciently translated into public goods
in neighboring states should have positive effects for a border county, similar to our base estimation (17). It might be
tempting to argue as well that there are no disincentive effects, as the entrepreneur in the border county is not immediately
subject to the other state's taxes, so that the taxation-growth connection would be unambiguously positive. This argument,
however, misses two pieces. First, as a technical matter, businesses pay taxes in states in which they sell products even if the
ﬁrm is not physically located there, so this border effect for local taxes is not as sharp for many types of ﬁrms. But more
importantly, taxes in the neighboring states can have disincentive effects for entrepreneurs in those states, and the resulting
reduced growth can weaken sales opportunities and entrepreneurial incentives for ﬁrms in the border counties. Thus, many
of the trade-offs we identiﬁed earlier persist, but we now have a setting where policies and corruption are determined with
less reference to the border counties themselves.8 Audretsch and Feldman (1986), Rosenthal and Strange (2001), Rosenthal and Strange (2004), Ellison et al. (2010), and Kerr and Kominers (2015)
describe the spatial lengths through which technology, product and labor markets can impact ﬁrms. Recent empirical work also highlights that entre-
preneurs disproportionately operate in their home regions (e.g., Figueiredo et al., 2002; Michelacci and Silva, 2007), which limits the extent to which
entrepreneurs would simply move to better opportunities.
Table 7a
Panel relationship of taxation, corruption and growth in county employment.
Narrowing Widening
Base estimation Counties with Counties with spatial range spatial range
using 100 mile Counties that Counties that >50% of local <50% of local from 100 miles from 100 miles
spatial ring border other do not border employment employment to 50 miles to 200 miles 
around county states other states in other states in other states around county around county
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log tax revenues per 0.046 0.074 0.046 0.028 0.050 0.034 0.014
gov. exp. in prior period (0.047) (0.053) (0.053) (0.098) (0.046) (0.037) (0.051)
Log corruption per 0.009 0.021 0.006 0.038* 0.005 0.005 0.007
gov. exp. in prior period (0.014) (0.016) (0.015) (0.021) (0.013) (0.011) (0.019)
Interaction of taxes and -0.032** -0.036 -0.035** -0.056** -0.035*** -0.022** -0.047**
corruption in prior period (0.013) (0.024) (0.014) (0.026) (0.013) (0.009) (0.021)
Lagged log county level -0.394*** -0.347*** -0.428*** -0.353*** -0.403*** -0.395*** -0.392***
in the prior period (0.023) (0.033) (0.028) (0.038) (0.027) (0.024) (0.024)
County and period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,180 4,216 6,964 2,853 8,327 11,180 11,180
Notes:  See Table 3a.  Estimations consider the panel relationships among taxation, corruption, and economic activity at the county level.  The panel consists of 2795 counties from 47 
states and four time periods of five years each (1988-1992 to 2003-2007), using lagged values from prior periods.  The dependent variable is log county employment growth.  The spatial 
explanatory metrics are defined using weighted averages of state activity in 100 mile rings around each county, adjusted in Columns 6 and 7 to 50 and 200 miles, respectively.  The 
variable of interest is the interaction of lagged spatial income tax receipts and corruption (i.e., criminal convictions of public officials).  Estimations weight by initial county employment, 
cluster standard errors by state, and include county and period fixed effects.  Similar to the state estimations, there is less future economic expansion and growth following periods of high 
tax revenues when corruption is high.  Columns 2-5 repeat this basic pattern in border versus non-border counties and when splitting the sample based upon whether a majority of local 
activity occurs in other neighboring states or not.  In border estimations, taxation and corruption are mostly determined in states other than the county's home state. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Disaggregating the county sample around state borders
Dependent variable is log growth in county employment
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are within 100 miles of the focal county within both home and neighboring states. We then use employment in these
identiﬁed counties to determine the share of economic activity in the 100-mile radius that comes from each identiﬁed state.
Every county has at least some share from its home state; the average share is 68%, and the home state share is 100% for
many counties. But many counties are inﬂuenced by one or more states other than their home states. We then use these
state shares within 100 miles to develop more localized measures of tax revenues, corruption, and their interactions by
taking the employment-weighted average across states. 38% of counties are on at least one state border, and 26% of counties
draw more than half of their effective inﬂuence from states other than their home states. These measures are speciﬁc to
focal counties, and thus they vary across counties within states.
Table 7a considers county employment growth as the dependent variable in a framework akin to Column 5 of Table 3a.
We include county and time period ﬁxed effects, and we continue to cluster standard errors by state. The results are quite
similar to those in our baseline state-level estimates, but the estimates are stronger and more precisely measured. Moreover,
the relative importance of the interaction effect to the baseline taxation effect has increased. This pattern is also repeated in
Column 1 of Table 7b for county growth in establishments, where the gains from Table 3a are even stronger. The dete-
rioration in taxation's impact for growth due to corruption is sharper with these more localized measures. (Unfortunately,
we do not have data to replicate the state GDP effects at the county level.)
The next four columns in both tables split the sample of counties. Columns 2 and 3 separate counties by
whether or not they are on a state border. Columns 4 and 5 separate counties by whether or not they have over 50% of the
localized activity around them determined by other states (which is the basis for the county-speciﬁc measures
of taxation and corruption). Elasticities in these periphery counties are very similar to those in the interiors of states.
Across the two tables, the main effects for taxation are stronger in the periphery areas in three of the four pairings,
and the interaction effects are stronger in all four decompositions for the periphery areas. The standard errors for the
periphery areas tend to be larger, but that is a natural consequence of the reduced sample size for estimations. The last two
columns show similar results if we narrow or widen the radius of the county-centered area to 50 miles or 200 miles,
respectively.9
Looking across Tables 7a and b, the persistence of the interaction effects provides strong support for the idea that local
corruption can deteriorate potential positive beneﬁts of taxation for public goods and economic growth. While corruption
and taxation choices will always have endogenous elements, the patterns we observe continue to hold when examining9 These patterns are quite similar when including squared taxation terms in periphery estimations. The squared terms are almost always statistically
insigniﬁcant and small in economic size.
Table 7b
Panel relationship of taxation, corruption and growth in county establishments.
Narrowing Widening
Base estimation Counties with Counties with spatial range spatial range
using 100 mile Counties that Counties that >50% of local <50% of local from 100 miles from 100 miles
spatial ring border other do not border employment employment to 50 miles to 200 miles 
around county states other states in other states in other states around county around county
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Log tax revenues per 0.073** 0.084** 0.068** 0.084* 0.066** 0.043* 0.038
gov. exp. in prior period (0.031) (0.037) (0.033) (0.047) (0.030) (0.025) (0.038)
Log corruption per 0.002 0.007 0.001 0.026 -0.003 0.000 -0.004
gov. exp. in prior period (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.018) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013)
Interaction of taxes and -0.025*** -0.042*** -0.021** -0.048 -0.023*** -0.015*** -0.033**
corruption in prior period (0.008) (0.014) (0.008) (0.033) (0.008) (0.006) (0.015)
Lagged log county level -0.316*** -0.325*** -0.309*** -0.337*** -0.297*** -0.315*** -0.312***
in the prior period (0.036) (0.037) (0.042) (0.038) (0.045) (0.038) (0.037)
County and period effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 11,180 4,216 6,964 2,853 8,327 11,180 11,180
Disaggregating the county sample around state borders
Notes:  See Table 7a.  The dependent variable is adjusted in these specifications to be log growth in county establishments. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
Dependent variable is log growth in county establishments
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gives us additional conﬁdence in our main growth results in Table 3a.
3.5. Discussion
Before turning to our quantiﬁcation exercises, we pause to reﬂect on this section's empirical ﬁndings
and the extent to which they align with our theoretical model. Our empirical evidence as a whole provides
reasonable evidence for the model's predictions; not perfect by any means, but hopefully allowing some
conﬁdence regarding the usefulness of our upcoming calibrated estimates. We see two places where the results
are strong. The ﬁrst is the core model prediction that corruption dampens or reverses a potential positive
growth stimulus from taxation at low tax rates. We have been impressed by the degree to which the data
align with this prediction as the prediction is rather complex, involving interactions of two variables in a panel econometric
setting. The result also holds in a variety of robustness checks and in state- and county-level growth outcomes.
A second place where we believe the results speak pretty well is in the direction of causation: that corruption and
taxation can inﬂuence growth. We readily acknowledge that we remain far from a complete proof in this regard, but the
accumulated evidence using Granger-style tests and state borders is encouraging. We hope future research can further push
on this front.
There are other areas where the model receives less support. First, our evidence for the predicted inverted-U
format of taxation for growth is modest. We almost always ﬁnd a negative coefﬁcient on the squared taxation term
when it is included in estimations. It is statistically signiﬁcant for growth of state GDP and in the levels approaches, while it
is smaller and not different from zero for the other growth measures. While a limitation of our empirical results, we are
comfortable with this outcome as the inverted-U shape is less critical than the negative interaction effect. Moreover, the root
cause of this limited ﬁnding appears to be that the empirical variation across US states in taxation, corruption, and growth is
limited to the left-hand-side of the inverted-U curve. The calibration in the next section will suggest this for the United
States as a whole. That is, we do not have Zimbabwe-type corruption scenarios in our sample, and we do not have settings
with 50%þ tax rates. As the variation in the United States is more modest, it is natural that we mostly capture the concavity
of the relationship to the left of the peak. This too is a natural vein for future work as consistent cross-country data become
available.
Perhaps the largest gap between the theory and empirics is for the negative main effect of corruption. Most of our point
estimates for corruption's impact are negative, consistent with the theory, but they are only really powerful in the growth
regressions that lack state ﬁxed effects. In other words, our empirical work ﬁnds it hard to really nail down this main
prediction using the panel variation that we feel important for identiﬁcation. We can identify a connection that corruption
has to taxes, but overall the implications of corruption and efﬁciency have residual uncertainty to them. This is an important
limitation to acknowledge given that the calibrations strongly emphasize the impact that improved government effec-
tiveness can have on growth. Glaeser and Saks (2006), using data similar to those we use in this paper, also ﬁnd overall
evidence of a decline in state-level growth with higher rates of corruption, but their work too notes differences across
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empirical and data advantages of regional variation in the United States, we hope new measures beyond convictions of
public ofﬁcials emerge for further analysis.10
Finally, we have focused the empirical work in this paper on panel econometric approaches, whereas recent
research ﬁnds important insights about related problems using applied-macro techniques like panel cointegration
(Coe et al., 2009; Bronzini and Piselli, 2009). Many of the series that we consider in this paper do not have unit
roots (e.g., corruption measured through convictions of public ofﬁcials relative to state size), and thus the core
of this methodology does not connect well to our current work. We do believe, however, that it is important to bring a
variety of techniques to studying this complex problem, and we hope that future work can consider some of these parallel
approaches.4. Generalized model with capital and calibration
In this section, we generalize the previous model by introducing capital. We then calibrate the model to estimate the
growth consequences of adjustments in taxation and corruption levels.
4.1. Introducing capital into the model
Consider the previous economy with the following modiﬁcations. The household also owns a balanced portfolio of all the
ﬁrms At and the entire capital stock Kt in the economy, which depreciates at the rate δk, and the household chooses its level
of investment in terms of units of the ﬁnal good. The ﬂow rate of capital is given by
_K t ¼ δKKtþHt ;
where Ht is the household's capital investment. Therefore, the household's budget constraint is
CtþHtþ _At ¼wtLtþRtKtþrtAtþβTt ;
where Rt is the rental rate of capital. The unique ﬁnal consumption good Yt is produced using capital Kt and continuum of
intermediates z (indexed by i) according to the CRS production function
Yt ¼ Kξt Z1ξt ;
where Zt is the basket of intermediate varieties as before.
With these modiﬁcations, following similar steps as before that are shown in the appendix, the equilibrium growth rate
is equal to
g ¼ 1β
 
τΠ
δα 1sð Þ 1τð Þϕ
þϕ 1τð Þ 1β
 
τ
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Π
1s
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is the operating proﬁts. Note that these expressions depend on the saving rate s 1C=Y . The equilibrium saving rate can
be expressed as
s ¼ g
þδK
gþδKþρ
 
ξ: ð18Þ
We take this generalized model to the data and calibrate it. In the calibrations below, we shall also look at the effects of
taxation and corruption on aggregate welfare. Since welfare is affected not just by growth but also by initial consumption,
the effect of taxation on welfare will also operate through its effect on the allocation of workers in the economy. More
precisely, equilibrium welfare is equal to
U ¼
Z 1
0
eρt ln C0eg
tL  dt
¼ 1
ρ
ln C0L
 þg
ρ2
: ð19Þ10 Other settings appear to yield this result more easily—Prakash (2014) ﬁnds stronger direct support for corruption's implications on growth in India;
Olken and Pande (2012) provide a broader review in the developing country context. While the micro and case study evidence tend to point towards a
negative effect of corruption, the macro evidence is inconclusive (e.g., Mauro, 1995; Svensson, 2005). Paserman et al. (2008) show the degree of country
openness moderates the impact of corruption.
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how changes in taxation affect welfare:
Lemma 2. Let χ be deﬁned as the consumption equivalent change in welfare between two different policies τ and τ0 such that
UðC0ðτÞ; LðτÞ; gðτÞÞ ¼UðχC0 τ0ð Þ; L τ0ð Þ; g τ0ð ÞÞ:
Consumption equivalence χ is given by
χ ¼ C0 τ
0ð Þ
C0 τð Þ
exp L τð ÞL τ0ð Þþg
ðτ0ÞgðτÞ
ρ
 
:
4.2. Calibration
This section calibrates our model to provide quantitative insights into the possible growth implications of adjustments in
US taxation rates and corruption/efﬁciency levels. To do so, our model requires calibrating the following parameters: the
discount rate ρ, the innovation step size λ, the corruption level β, the tax rate τ, the infrastructure depreciation rate δα, the
capital depreciation rate δK, and the entry cost ϕ.
We ﬁrst set several parameters using benchmark values from the literature. We set the discount rate as ρ¼ 0:04, which
corresponds to the average 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Rate minus inﬂation over 1982–2007. We next ﬁx the
depreciation rates δα ¼ δK at the benchmark 15% rate for equipment and machinery. We ﬁnally set the capital share of
expenditure at 29:5% ξ¼ 0:295ð Þ following Aghion et al. (2013) and typical values from the business cycle literature.
We use the key moments predicted by our model to identify the remaining parameters. The ﬁrst moment M1 is the
employment share of entrants that is computed from the Census Bureau data over 1982–2005. The second moment M2 is
the aggregate growth rate of the innovating sector in the US economy that is also calculated from Census Bureau data by
Acemoglu et al. (2011). The third moment M3 is the average proﬁtability of US ﬁrms before taxation, obtained from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis for 1982–2007. The ﬁnal moment M4 is the corporate tax revenue share of GDP over 1982–
2007. Our target moments and their values are summarized as:11 As a second benchmark, the US Census Bureau report
12 The government share of the workforce is 4%, which i
This difference is mostly due to our one-for-one technologys that 3% of the population (above 25 years of age) hold
s low compared to the roughly 15% of US workers empl
for infrastructure provision embodied in (6).Moment Value DescriptionM1 0.058 Entrant employment share
M2 0.022 Growth rate
M3 0.091 Average proﬁtability before tax
M4 0.034 Corporate tax revenue over GDPWe divide M4 by M3 to pin down the average tax rate τ. Next, we use M2, M3 and M4 jointly to solve for λ, β and ϕ. The
calibrated values are:
Parameter Value Descriptionλ 0.205 Innovation step size
ϕ 5.794 Outsider's innovation technology
β 0.243 Average corruption
τ 0.374 Average corporate tax rate
δα 0.150 Infrastructure depreciation rate
ξ 0.295 Capital share of expenditure
δK 0.150 Capital depreciation rateWe next report the equilibrium values of some of the endogenous variables. The ﬁrst two rows provide shares of GDP,
with labor income and capital income shares being 67.4% and 29.5%, respectively. Our calibrated model predicts that cor-
ruption revenue amounts to a little less than 1% of GDP.
The next three rows provide the allocation of labor across functions. 86.9% of workers are involved in production
activities, while about 9.3% are involved in innovation efforts as either incumbents or outsiders. This innovation employ-
ment share is quite reasonable given our broad deﬁnition of innovation efforts. To take manufacturing as an example, in
1997 there were 363 thousand establishments that employed 12.1 and 4.7 million production and non-production workers,
respectively. A strict lower bound would be that there is one innovationworker per establishment (e.g., the business owner),
which would imply an innovation worker share of 2%. On the other hand, saying that all non-production workers are
involved in innovation would result in a share of 28%. Our calculation suggests that one in every three non-production
workers is involved in innovation efforts.11,12advanced degrees.
oyed by state and local governments.
P. Aghion et al. / European Economic Review 86 (2016) 24–5144Finally, the calibration estimates that the innovation rate per product line is about 12% 6:2% þ5:8%ð Þ. At this rate, an
innovation occurs in a product line on average every eight years. The calibration suggests that the rate coming from
incumbents is 7% ¼ 6:2=5:81  more than the rate of successful outsiders.Fig.
Fig. 2. Growth1. Growth as a function of the tax rate.
as a function of the tax rate and corruption rate.Variable Value (%) DescriptionLw=Y 67.40 GDP share: Labor income
s 23.94 GDP share: Investment
βT=Y 0.83 GDP share: Corruption
LP=L 86.88 Labor share: Production workers
ðLIþLEÞ=L 9.30 Labor share: Innovation workers
LG=L 3.82 Labor share: Government workers
x 6.22 Incumbent's innovation intensity
~x 5.80 Entry rateWe next consider the relationship between corruption, taxation, and growth. Fig. 1 plots the equilibrium growth rate as a
function of the corporate tax rate. As predicted by our analysis in the previous section, the relationship between taxation
and growth is an inverted-U shaped pattern. The peak occurs at τmax ¼ 42:47%, marked by the dashed line, which indicates
that the empirical tax rate (37%) is quite close to the growth maximizing level for the current level of corruption. Fig. 2 plots
the equilibrium growth rate as a function of the tax rate and the corruption rate β. For any given tax rate, higher corruption
leads to a lower growth rate. According to the calibrated numbers and holding constant the tax rate at its current level,
removing corruption completely ðβ¼ 0Þ from its current level of β¼ 0:243 improves the growth rate to 3.23%. This is a
substantial increase of 22% in consumption equivalent terms.
The intuition behind the inverted-U shaped pattern comes from the two opposing effects of taxation. Taxation allows the
government to provide better infrastructure, which in turn makes ﬁrms more productive and enhances growth. On the
Fig. 3. Consumption equivalence as a function of the tax rate.
Fig. 4. Consumption equivalence as a function of the corruption rate.
P. Aghion et al. / European Economic Review 86 (2016) 24–51 45other hand, higher taxation lowers monopoly rents, and this negative effect becomes the dominant factor beyond a certain
tax rate. Higher corruption dampens the positive effect of taxes by simply taking away the available resources that could
have been utilized for growth enhancing infrastructure.
Turning to welfare, we use expression (19). It is more informative to discuss the consumption equivalent variation ðχÞ
after tax changes, and Fig. 3 plots χ as a function of the tax rate τ. Note that by construction, χ ¼ 1 at the empirical tax rate
τ¼ 37%. The plot indicates the percentage change in initial consumption that would make the household indifferent
between the empirical tax rate and the counterfactual tax rate. The main difference betweenwelfare and growth is the labor
supply component in the former, which is simply equal to the disutility of work. However, our quantitative analysis shows
that the effect of taxation on welfare is driven mostly through its impact on growth. Hence, the growth and welfare
maximizing tax rates are very close to each other. The welfare maximizing tax rate is computed as 42.3%, which is
5.3 percentage points higher than the current calibrated tax rate τ¼ 37%. We estimate that a modest 1.1% welfare gain
would accrue from setting the optimal tax rate while holding ﬁxed current corruption levels.
More interestingly, Fig. 4 plots the consumption equivalent gain from changing the corruption level. The value is one at
β¼ 0:243 by construction. At the extreme, removing the corruption completely ðβ¼ 0Þ results in a 22% consumption
equivalent welfare gain, and reducing corruption by very modest amounts provides the same welfare gain as optimizing
taxation for the current level of corruption. Taken a step further, eliminating corruption would raise the optimal tax to 42.5%,
which would further boost growth to 3.3% and welfare by 24% in consumption equivalent terms.
Turning to extensions, the impact of taxation and corruption on the equilibrium ﬁrm size distribution (FSD) is ambiguous
due to two opposing effects. Better environments enhance the productivity of incumbent ﬁrms, leading to growth in average
ﬁrm size through additional product lines, but higher entry rates and incumbent displacement are also encouraged. Fig. 5
plots the FSD against tax rates, whereas Fig. 6 plots average ﬁrm size against tax rates. Initially, taxation increases reduce
average ﬁrm size. As the tax rate increases, after a certain point, the tail of the distributions starts getting fatter. Fig. 6 shows
Fig. 5. Firm size distribution as a function of the tax rate.
Fig. 6. Average ﬁrm size as a function of the tax rate.
P. Aghion et al. / European Economic Review 86 (2016) 24–5146that the average ﬁrm size initially decreases and then starts rising for τ beyond around 23%. This is mainly driven by the
competitive pressure imposed on incumbents from new entrants.
The tax rate that maximizes economic growth also maximizes innovation for a given corruption level. We earlier noted
that incumbents' innovation rate per product line in this calibration is higher than the success rate of outsiders for acquiring
their ﬁrst product line. Fig. 7 plots the ratio of the entrants' innovation intensity to total innovation intensity ~x=ðxþ ~xÞ by tax
rate for the calibrated corruption level. The relative innovation rate by the entrants features an inverted-U shaped pattern.
Starting from zero, initial taxation beneﬁts entrants more than incumbents. As a result, incumbent ﬁrms face tighter
competition and cannot grow in size as much. This competitive pressure initially increases with higher tax rates due to more
innovation by entrants. However, when the tax rate is already sufﬁciently large, the negative effect of taxation starts to
dominate and discourages entrants from investing in innovation due to lower returns. This weakens the competitive
pressure on incumbents, they expand in size, and they thereby generate a greater share of the economy's innovations. As the
incumbents' innovation rate per product line is higher than the success rate of outsiders for acquiring their ﬁrst product line,
the tax rate that maximizes the entrant share is lower than the tax rate that maximizes growth. Removing corruption
increases the entrant share at all tax rates, while further pushing down the tax rate that maximizes the entrant share.13
To conclude, our calibrated model estimates substantial growth rate reductions and welfare losses are present in the US
economy due to corruption and non-optimal tax rates. The gains from optimizing the tax rate are fairly modest, in the range
of 1%. The potential gains from improving government efﬁciency are estimated to be much larger and over 20%. Most of the
welfare losses come from poor use of government funds, not from the sub-optimal tax.13 This model does not allow entrants and incumbents to engage in different types of innovation or to have different step sizes to their innovations
(Akcigit and Kerr, 2010). Building these differences into the model would have a larger impact on this part of the calibration and the comparison of entrants
and incumbents than on other parts of the model.
Fig. 7. Entrant share of innovation as a function of the tax rate.
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In this paper we have analyzed the effect of taxation and corruption on growth, innovation, and entry. First, we have built
an endogenous growth model with quality-improving innovations that lead to new product lines, and then calibrated this
model to assess the welfare effects of the interaction between taxation and corruption. Then, using cross-state and then
cross-county panel data from the Longitudinal Business Database (LBD) of the US Census Bureau, we have obtained evidence
that is consistent with the theoretical prediction that the effect of taxation on growth and innovation should be increasing
and concave, and that higher local corruption should weaken the positive effect of taxation on growth, innovation, and
entry. Evidence also suggests this effect operates through entrepreneurial channels consistent with the model's structure.
This paper is a very ﬁrst step in a broader research agenda on how to factor in growth and innovation considerations in
optimal tax design. In particular, there are large debates in the US Congress and among European countries on how pro-
gressive the income tax should be and on the desirable corporate tax rate. However, analyses of these issues often do not
feature innovation and growth as leading criteria in the design of a desirable tax system. We believe it very important to
begin linking the growth and revenue sides of the public ledger to the spending side and the overall effectiveness on how
public funds are spent. This paper makes several forays into theoretical and empirical dimensions, and we believe we are
just scratching the surface of what could be exciting and important research aimed at better linking public ﬁnance con-
ditions to entrepreneurship, innovation, and growth.Acknowledgments
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:
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x¼ vα
2
1τ:
Substituting this value back into the value function we get
v2α2
2 1τ½ v r
þμ þ 1τ½ π ¼ 0: □
Derivation of growth rate: From (2) and the optimal quantity of intermediate good j,
ln Yt ¼ ln Qt ln 1þλ
 
; ð20Þ
where ln Qt 
R 1
0 ln qt ið Þdi is deﬁned as the quality index at time t . Therefore,
g¼
_Y
Y
¼
_Q
Q
:
Next consider the change in the quality index after a small time interval Δt,
ln QtþΔt 
Z 1
0
μΔtln 1þλ  q ið Þþ 1μΔt  ln q ið Þ di:
Some simple algebra leads to ln QtþΔt ln Qt ¼ μΔtln 1þλ
 
. Dividing both sides by Δt and taking the limit as Δt-0
delivers
g ¼
_Q
Q
¼ μln 1þλ : □
Proof of Proposition 1. Using (13)–(16), the growth rate is
g τð Þ ¼ 1β
 
1τ½ τϕ
δα
λ2
1þλ 2
1
4ϕ4 1τ½ 4
" #
ln 1þλ ρ ln 1þλ :
Then the derivative with respect to τ is
∂g τð Þ
∂τ
¼ χ 12τð Þ λ
2
1þλ 2
1
4ϕ4 1τ½ 4
" #
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
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 χτ
ϕ4 1τ½ 4
;
where χ  1β½  ln 1þλð Þϕδα . Φ τð Þ is monotonically decreasing in τ and Φ 0ð Þ40 by Assumption 1. Therefore
∂g τð Þ
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τ ¼ 0
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∂τ

τ ¼ τg
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1τg
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1þ2τg
s
¼ 1þλ
2λϕ2
: □
Proof of Proposition 2. The entry rate is
~x ¼ 1τ½  τ 1β
 
ϕ
δ
π 1
2ϕ2 1τ½ 2
" #2
ρ:
The derivative with respect to the tax rate is
∂ ~x
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¼ 12τ½ κ π 1
2ϕ2 1τ½ 2
" #2
 τ2κ
ϕ2 1τ½ 2
π 1
2 1τ½ 2ϕ2
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" #
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Ψ τð Þ
π  1
2 1τ½ 2ϕ2
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Π τð Þ
;
where κ  1β ϕ=δ. Note that Π τð Þ40 for all τA 0; τ½  . Moreover Ψ τð Þ is monotone decreasing in τ, Ψ τð ÞoΠ τð Þ and
Ψ 0ð Þ40. The peak of the inverted-U happens when Ψ τ ~xð Þ ¼ 0 such that
12τ ~x½  1τ ~x½ 2
1þ2τ ~x½ 
¼ 1
2πϕ2
:
Then ∂ ~x

∂τ 40 if and only if τoτ ~x . □
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UðC0 τð Þ; L τð Þ; g τð ÞÞ ¼UðχC0 τ0ð Þ; L τ0ð Þ; g τ0ð ÞÞ:
From (19) this implies
ln C0 τ0ð ÞL τ0ð Þ
ρ
þg
 τ0ð Þ
ρ2
¼ ln χC0 τð ÞL
 τð Þ
ρ
þg
 τð Þ
ρ2
;
which delivers the desired result
χ ¼ C0 τ
0ð Þ
C0 τð Þ
exp L τð ÞL τ0ð Þþg
 τ0ð Þg τð Þ
ρ
 
: □
Derivation of the equilibrium with capital: Household maximizes discounted sum of future utilities subject to the budget
constraint
CtþHtþ _A ¼ RtKtþwtLtþβTtþrA;
where H denotes the capital investment. This maximization delivers
w ¼ C
R ¼ ρþδKþg:
The interest rate is r ¼ RδK ¼ ρþg.
Next, we solve the monopolist's problem. Since the ﬁnal goods production function is CRS Cobb–Douglas, and since
factors are paid their marginal product, Euler's theorem implies that expenditure on intermediates is ð1ξÞYt (i.e.
expenditure share of Zt is 1ξ). Furthermore, logarithmic aggregation of intermediates implies that expenditure on each
variety is the same. Therefore, demand for variety i is given by:
zt ið Þ ¼
ð1ξÞYt
ptðiÞ
:
Bertrand limit pricing in each product line i implies that the current innovator ﬁrm prices at marginal cost of previous
innovator, and therefore
pt ið ÞMCt ið Þ ¼
λwt
qtðiÞ
:
So monopolist proﬁts are:
πYt ¼
1ξ λ
1þλ Yt ¼
1ξ
1s
 
λ
1þλ
 
w;
where Ct ¼ ð1sÞYt . Next, we move onto the incumbent's innovation problem; the incumbent's value function of
operating n product lines is
rVt nð Þ _V t nð Þ ¼maxx
1τð Þn πYt
w
2
x
αt
 2" #
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
instantaneous return
þxn½Vtðnþ1ÞVtðnÞ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
gain product line
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>>>>;
where μ is the aggregate innovation rate in the economy. Conjecture VðnÞ ¼ vnYt:
x ¼ α
2v
ð1sÞð1τÞ:
Examining the entrant's problem, free entry means Vout ¼ 0. Also, Ev¼ v; therefore
v ¼ wt
ϕαYt
¼ ð1sÞ
ϕα
and
x ¼ α

ϕð1τÞ:
Along the BGP, the level of infrastructure is constant, which implies that
F ¼ δαα:
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Π  πx
2ð1sÞ
2 αð Þ2
¼ π ð1sÞ
2ϕ2 1τð Þ2
:
Government's balanced budget implies
F ¼ 1β
 
τΠ
1sð Þ :
So, equilibrium level of infrastructure is
α ¼ 1β
 
τΠ
δα 1sð Þ
:
Solving for the entrants innovation ﬂow rate,
~x ¼ϕ 1τð Þα
Π
ð1sÞ ρ;
and the aggregate innovation rate is
μ ¼ α

1τð Þϕþ
ϕ 1τð ÞαΠ
ð1sÞ ρ:
On the BGP, labor supply L remains constant over time. Productivity growth (growth in Q(t)) will be determined by the
aggregate destruction rate μ:
g ¼ μ log ð1þλÞ:
The next step is to derive the consumption share of output 1s. Capital stock has to grow at the same rate as productivity
and output. Assume investment H(t) is proportional to K(t) (i.e. HðtÞ=KðtÞ ¼ ζ). Then, from the law of motion for capital,
g ¼ ζδK :
So, investment HðtÞ ¼ ðgþδK ÞKðtÞ. Applying the Euler theorem to the ﬁnal goods production gives RKðtÞ=YðtÞ ¼ ξ, which
implies that
H tð Þ ¼ ðg
þδK Þ
R
ξY tð Þ;
and from the resource constraint, HðtÞ=YðtÞ ¼ s, which solves implicitly for the investment share of consumer expenditure
s¼ g
þδK
gþδKþρ
 
ξ: □Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euro
ecorev.2016.01.012.References
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